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NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES ARISING
OUT OF RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY
Today the value of organized recreational programs for em-
ployees is being recognized in an ever-increasing number of
American businesses.' Management-sponsored activities, more-
over, have been supplemented in many instances by various
forms of social and athletic amusement developed by the workers
themselves. It is the purpose of this note to exmine the various
claims which injured workers have raised seeking compensa-
tion for injuries received while engaged in some sort of recrea-
tional activity which reasonably could be associated with their
employment.
Workmen's compensation statutes now have been enacted in
every one of the United States. 2 They are designed to assure
prompt and adequate benefit payments to employees who are
injured as the result of an accident which is attributable to their
employment.3 These payments are made without considering
the question of fault or blame under the theory that the cost
of such injuries should be borne as a legitimate expense of
production. 4 There is, however, one important requirement im-
posed by the statutes-that is that the injury must have arisen
"out of and in the course of" the worker's employment. 5 An
interpretation of this phrase which is customarily applied by
the courts was given in a leading Massachusetts case:
... an injury is received "in the course of" the employ-
ment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty
which he is employed to perform. It arises "out of" the
employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind
upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal con-
nection between the conditions under which the work is
required to be performed and the resulting injury.6
The courts in increasing numbers have been called on to apply
such provision to the claims of workers who have been injured
1. MAZE, OFFICE MANAGEMENT 165 (1947).
2. U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 78 (1946).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 3691 (1939).
6. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 498, 102 N.E. 697, 697 (1913).
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in some sort of recreational activity connected with their
work. It has been the task of the injured workman to show
that even though he was engaged in such an activity at the
time of his injury, there was a close enough relationship
between that activity and his usual work that he should be
considered to have been acting within the scope of his em-
ployment.
In those cases where a worker has been required by his
employer to participate in the recreational activity in which he
was injured, there has been a unanimous willingness to allow
recovery. Thus, where a fireman was required to exercise
while off duty,7 where a saleman was instructed to attend a
dinner and demonstration," and where an employee was re-
quired to supervise the practice games of a company-sponsored
baseball team,9 the employee was allowed to recover workmen's
compensation benefits for injuries resulting from the compul-
sory conduct. In each case the court seemed to have little diffi-
culty in concluding that an act performed at the direct command
of the worker's superior was an act arising out of and in the
course of his employment.
Where a worker has been encouraged, though not required,
by his employer to enter into a specific form of recreation, or
where he voluntarily enters into the activity under no form of
compulsion whatsoever, the courts customarily grant or deny
recovery for injuries so received on the basis of other factors.
It is submitted that by far the most important factor for the
injured workman to consider at this point is the possibility
of persuading the court that even though the participation was
optional, the employer received some direct business gain from
the activity in which the injury occurred. In considering this
factor the courts generally choose not to include within such
"benefits" the mere fostering of good will or the raising of
morale in the employees. The latter results of employer-spon-
sored activity are generally considered "too tenuous and
7. Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission et at., 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d
644 (1943).
8. Sinclair v. Wallach Laundry, 252 App. Div. 715, 298 N.Y. Supp. 686(3d Dep't 1937); accord, Stakonis v. United Advertising Co. et at., 110
Conn. 384, 148 Atl. 334 (1930); Miller v. Keystone Appliances, Inc. et al.,
133 Pa. 354, 2 A.2d 508 (1938).
9. Huber v. Eagle Stationery Corp., 254 App. Div. 788, 4 N.Y.S.2d 272(1938).
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ephemeral" in and by themselves to place an employee within
the scope of his employment.10 But, given a more substantial
showing that the employer's interests were being furthered
financially by the employee at the time of his injury, the courts
have consistently granted recovery even though the injury oc-
curred while in the process of play or recreation.
The "benefit" factor is exemplified in three recent cases
where companies sponsored and equipped baseball teams which
customarily played in public and before spectators, with the
team members wearing uniforms bearing the name of their
employer. The courts allowed workmen's compensation bene-
fits to injured players. These decisions were based, largely at
least, on the ground that the employees were serving their
employer by advertising his name at the time of their injuries. 1
Similarly, where a salesman was killed on a fishing trip which
had been financed by his employer as a reward in a competitive
sales campaign, recovery was allowed, and the decision of the
court was based on the fact that the entire scheme was of obvious
benefit to the employer in that it provided incentive for in-
creased sales.12 In another case, the New York Stock Exchange
was shown to have encouraged its employees to engage in com-
petitive sports and to enter teams which the exchange had
sponsored for that purpose. The games were played against
similar teams in and around New York City, and the schedule
was arranged by the employer who kept the receipts and paid
any deficits arising from the venture. The Appellate Division
in awarding the benefits of workmen's compensation to a page
who was injured while playing on a team so sponsored said:
We are not required to decide whether the employer was
actuated by a belief that the venture was wise because of
10. It seems that it would be a safe presumption to conclude that every
activity backed by an employer to the extent of financial expenditures must
be, to some extent, beneficial to the sponsor. As stated in a New York deci-
sion: "The officials of a corporation may not extend largess from stock-
holders' money." Holst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233,
234, 299 N.Y. Supp. 255, 256 (1st Dep't 1937).
11. Fishman v. Lafayette Radio Corp. et al., 275 App. Div. 876, 89
N.Y.S.2d 563 (3d Dep't, 1949); Ott v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ohio
App.13, 82 N.E.2d 137 (1948); Le Bar v. Ewald Brothers Dairy et al., 217
Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944) ; Contra: Auerbach Co. et al. v. Industrial
Commission et al., 195 P.2d 245 (Utah, 1948).
12. Linderman et al. v. Cownie Furs et al., 234 Iowa 708, 13 N.W.2d 677(1944); Kelly v. Ochiltree Electric Co. et al., 125 Pa. 161, 190 AtI. 167
(1937).
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its advertising features or because of the improved health
and morale of the employees. The maintenance of the team
was a matter of business, not of charity or benevolence.13
[italics added]
The foregoing cases have demonstrated how a clear financial
benefit may accrue to an employer from the recreational acti-
vities he sponsors. These financial benefits, moreover, are en-
tirely distinct from any co-existent benefits which might have
arisen from the raising of his employees' morale or efficiency.
The courts have allowed recovery to injured workers on the
ground that where an employer receives a clear financial benefit
from some activity of his employees, he is required to bear
the cost of any injuries the workers receive while so engaged.
Occasionally, the courts have presumed a financial benefit when,
perhaps, the facts justify the presumption less clearly. For
example, in a recent New Jersey case 4 recovery was allowed
to an airplane mechanic's helper who was injured while taking
a pleasure flight with the owner of a plane which he had just
helped repair. The court pointed out that this and similar
flights had been encouraged by the plaintiff's superior and
that they were a distinct benefit to the latter in that his
workers thereby became more familiar with the performance
of the machines they were to repair by observing actual flight
conditions. An analogous fact situation arose when a caddy was
injured while playing a practice game on his employer's course.
Here the court also granted recovery, stating that it was a fair
inference that the caddies were encouraged to play and that
such activity would tend to make them more efficient and thus
better able to serve their employer."s In these cases the courts
again relied heavily on the financial benefit to the plaintiff's
employer arising out of the activity in which the employee was
,injured. The benefit, though it may not appear as clearly as
in the preceding group of cases, still seems adequate to justify
the decisions.
While the employee's presence on the premises of his em-
ployer is usually not a factor strongly influencing a finding that
13. Holst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233, 234, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 255, 256 (1937).
14. Owens v. Bennett Air Service et al., 133 N.J.L. 540 (Sup. Ct.), 45
A. 2d 320 (1946).
15. Puisinsky v. Transit Valley Country Club, 259 App. Div. 765, Is
N.Y.S.2d 316 (3d Dep't 1940).
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he was within the scope of his employment, if this presence is
coupled with the fact that the worker is on his lunch hour, many
courts are inclined to find that he is then acting within the
course of his employment. In other words, there is a substantial
body of case law which finds a financial benefit to an employer
from the mere presence of his employees on his premises during
the workers' lunch hour. In about two-thirds of the cases in-
volving injury to an employee while he was voluntarily en-
gaged in some noon-time recreation, the injured employee has
recovered workmen's compensation benefits. The leading case 6
allowed recovery to a seventeen-year-old girl who was injured
while riding on an interdepartmental truck during her lunch
hour. The activity was not connected in any way with her
usual job and was purely a means of recreation. The court
pointed out that because of the brevity of the time allotted for
lunch it was to be expected that most of the employees would
remain on the premises. Such presence, the court said, was in
itself a benefit to the employer because it thereby became pos-
sible for the workers to be more punctual than if they had
gone elsewhere. The decision also noted that the activity in
which employee was injured had been engaged in by the plaintiff
and her fellow employees for some time previous to the occur-
rence and that this fact was well known to her supervisors.
The benefit in this case, when considered objectively, might seem
more illusory than the benefits of the preceding cases, but
the "lunch hour benefit" concept is still retained by a majority
of the courts and must be considered as a factor weighing their
decisions.
When a court fails to find any financial benefit whatsoever
in the recreational activity of the employees other than the
fostering of good will and morale in the workers themselves,
recovery for injuries received in such activity is generally
16. Thomas v. Procter and Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372
(1919); accord, Conklin v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App.
309, 41 S.W.2d 608 (1931); Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120
Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185 (1947) ; Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470,
33 S.W.2d 90 (1930); cf. Bowen v. Saratoga Springs Commission et al., 267
App. Div. 928, 46 N.Y.S.2d 822 (3d Dep't 1944) ; Brown v. United Services
for Air, Inc. et al., 273 App. Div. 932, 78 N.Y.S.2d 37 (3d Dep't 1948).
Contra: Luteran v. Ford Motor Co., 313 Mich. 487, 21 N.W.2d 825 (1946) ;
Dunnaway et ux. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. et al., 227 Mo. App.
1211, 61 S.W.2d 398 (1933); Theberge v. Public Service Electric and Gas
Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 149, 51 A.2d 248 (1947).
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denied. This doctrine has received recent reemphasis by the
New York Court of Appeals in the case of Wilson v. General
Motors Corporation.1" There recovery was denied to an em-
ployee who was injured while playing softball on one of four-
teen teams organized into a league at his employer's plant. The
games were played on the workers' own time and in a city park.
The employer had supplied the teams with $1000 worth of
equipment and had permitted league officials to confer on com-
pany time. The court, in a four to three decision, refused to
award compensation on the ground that there was neither con-
trol by nor benefit to the employer from the teams' activity.
The court said:
... We look in vain for evidence of any business advantage
or benefit accruing to the company from the employees'
participation in the contests. Too tenuous and ephemeral
is the possibility that such participation might perhaps
indirectly benefit the employer by improving the workers'
morale or health or by fostering employee good will.B
In an earlier Michigan case19 where the defendant corpora-
tion maintained a gymnasium on its premises and encouraged its
employees to make use of the facilities, the court denied re-
covery to a workman who was injured while playing in the
gym after working hours. Two somewhat similar cases 20 arose
where employees were injured while using railroad facilities
which had been provided by their employer for their pleasure
and convenience. Here the courts again denied recovery for
the injured employees on the ground that the acts were purely
voluntary and because of the fact that the workers were not
engaged in the furtherance of their employer's business at the
time of their injuries.
Generally, when a caddy is gratuitously permitted to use his
employer's course in his spare time, the courts have not seen
17. 298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781 (1949).
18. Id. at p. 473, 84 N.E.2d at p. 784; accord, Industrial Commission of
Colorado et al. v. Murphy, 102 Col. 59, 76 P.2d 741 (1938); Tom Joyce
7 Up Company v. Layman, 112 Ind. App. 369, 44 N.E.2d 998 (1942);
Porowski v. American Can Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 316, 191 Ati. 296 (1937);
Leventhal v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 25 N.J. Misc. 154, 51 A.2d 237(1946); Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Co. et al., 198 S.C. 159, 17 S.E.2d 146(1941).
19. Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24, 267 N.W. 589 (1936).
20. Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 157 Wash.
96, 288 Pac. 655 (1930); Graf v. Montecito County Water District, 26 P.2d
29 (Cal., 1933).
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fit to acknowledge any financial benefit resulting to the employer.
The courts, with the exception noted above, 21 have ruled that the
only benefits are of the morale and goodwill variety which cannot
in themselves place the employee within the scope of his em-
ployment.22 Similarly, where a student employed as a camp
counselor was injured while playing tennis on the camp courts
at a time when he was not on duty but was subject to call, no
compensation benefits were awarded.2 3 Again, where an em-
ployer or association of employees sponsors a picnic for the
workers and where attendance is not required either directly
or indirectly, the courts generally deny recovery to an employee
injured while at the affair or while traveling to or from it. 24
The foregoing cases have been grouped in an attempt to
show the amount of emphasis which has been given the financial
benefit factor in the courts' decisions. This emphasis has gen-
erally received specific mention, but in some of the cases its
actual weight may have been concealed in the discussion of other
factors. Nevertheless, it seems that from a consideration of
all the cases involving injury to an employee engaged in a
voluntary recreational activity, the financial benefit to his
employer becomes the only reliable criterion for predicting
whether he will receive the compensation award for which he
is bringing suit. Other factors which are generally given weight
in suits of this type include the amount of financial backing given
the activity by the employer, the place where the activity took
place with regard to the employee's usual place of work, and
the possibility of classifying the activity as one customarily
engaged in by the employees. None of these factors appears
to be controlling, but each may be taken into consideration when
present. -EDWIN CHARLE JR.
21. See note 15 supra.
22. Stevens v. Essex Falls Country Club, 136 N.J.L. 656, 57 A.2d 469(1948) ; McManus' Case, 289 Mass. 65, 193 N.E. 732 (1935).
23. State Y.M.C.A. et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., 235 Wis. 161,
292 N.W. 324 (1940).
24. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 333
Ill. 340, 164 N.E. 668 (1928) ; Stout v. Sterling Aluminum Products Co., 239
Mo. App. 418, 213 S.W.2d 244 (1948) ; Fick v. American Mut. Liability Ins.
Co. 26 N.J. Misc. 244, 58 A.2d 854 (1948); Maeda v. Department of Labor
and Industries, 192 Wash. 87, 72 P.2d 1035 (1937). Contra: Ackerson v.
Jennings Co., 107 Conn. 393, 140 AtI. 760 (1928) ; Fagan v. Albany Evening
Union Co. et al., 261 App. Div. 861, 24 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1941).
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